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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann
§78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Joshua presents what he claims to be nine different issues in his brief to this
Court. However, Cassie believes there are actually only four issues before this Court.
One issue is the division of assets and liabilities between the parties; the second is the
award of some attorney's fees to Cassie following Joshua's contempt; the third is a
procedural issue concerning the denial of Joshua's Motion to Continue the trial for a
third time; and Joshua's last issue mentioned is the award of sole legal and physical
custody of the parties'children to Cassie.
HISTORY OF THE CASE
Joshua and Cassie Clarke were married in September 2002, had two children,
and lived in Tooele. Once the parties separated in July 2008 under the provisions of a
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Protective Order issued to Cassie under case #084300356, Joshua moved to the Salt
Lake valley to live with his parents.
The Protective Order was replaced by a Mutual Restraining Order entered on
October 30, 2008 under this divorce case. {Trial Court Record page 45 (TR 45)}
The parties were before the Court on March 16, 2009, for an OSC concerning
Joshua's refusal to return certain items of personal property to Cassie, to include a
tripod and a heirloom B-B gun, and his refusal to sign the application forms for the
children's passports. Joshua's contempt was certified for an evidentiary hearing
concerning his refusal to return the personal property and Cassie's attorney's fees.
(TR71)
After the parties failed to reach any agreement during mediation in June 2009,
(TR 77) the case was certified for trial in August 2009 (TR 78) based upon Cassie's
certification for readiness for trial. (TR 73)
A pretrial Order listing 5 issues for trial was issued on September 14, 2009. (TR
80) The five issues certified for trial were limited to:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Parent time schedules as the older child enters school.
Obligations for child support, day care and medical expenses.
Ownership, equity distribution, and possession of marital real property.
Distribution of marital personal property to include those items for which
certification of respondent's contempt had previously been issued.
e. Award of the attorney's fees the petitioner incurred in bringing the previous
OSC hearings before the Court.
There was no certification of the issue of physical custody of the children and
no request for a custody evaluation was ever made prior to this certification for trial.
Joshua's first counsel of record, Russell T. Monahan never requested any custody
evaluation prior to his withdrawal in January 2009. (TR 49)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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On October 2, 2009, Joshua's second counsel of record, Grant Morrison
certified that all discovery had been completed and represented that the matter was
ready for trial. (TR 82) A bench trial was scheduled for December 17, 2009, following
the two parties' independent requests for trial. (TR 86)
Joshua's second attorney made his first Motion to Continue Trial on November
2, 2009 and then withdrew from the case. (TR 90)
On December 1, 2009, Joshua's third attorney of record, Larry Larsen
appeared and requested additional discovery. (TR 95) A hearing was held on
December 7, 2009 and at that time, for the first time, Joshua demanded to conduct a
deposition of Cassie. The court continued the trial until January 22, 2010 to
accommodate the deposition of Cassie based upon Joshua's assurance that it would
be timely completed without the need to further continue the trial. (TR 93) Joshua
never conducted any deposition of Cassie.
Two weeks before the scheduled trial, on January 6, 2010, his third attorney
filed Joshua's second Motion to Continue (TR 99) and for the first time, Joshua
demanded the conduct of a custody evaluation via his Motion to Appoint a Custody
Evaluator. (TR102)
On January 19, 2010, another pre-trial conference was conducted, at which
time the court entered the parties' divorce under a bifurcated proceeding and
rescheduled the trial concerning the five certified issues for March 17, 2010. (TR 114)
The Custody evaluation was allowed to proceed on the basis that it would not
delay the trial past March 17, 2010 and that Joshua would fully fund the evaluator's
cost within 10 days. (TR 149)
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On February 9, 2010 the court issued an Order appointing a custody evaluator
that contained the specific requirement that the custody evaluation be completed in
time for trial on March 17, 2010. (TR 149)
Joshua's third attorney then withdrew on the next day, February 10, 2010. Mr.
Larsen was replaced by Joshua's fourth attorney of record Suzzanne Marelius who on
March 4, 2010, filed Joshua's third Motion to Continue the trial which is the subject of
this appeal. (TR 182)
Another pre-trial conference was conducted on March 8, 2010 at which time the
court denied Joshua's third Motion to Continue. (TR 183)
The trial was conducted on March 17, 2010 (TR 193) and completed on March
31, 2010 (TR 195), followed by the court issuing its Memorandum Decision on April
18, 2010. (TR 212) The court instructed Cassie's attorney to draft the Findings and
Decree based upon its Memorandum Decision, which he did having served the
proposed Findings and Decree on Joshua on or about June 16, 2010.
In August 2010, Joshua objected to the content of the Findings and he filed his
Motion to Allocate House Equity and to Reconsider Property Division.
The court conducted a hearing on September 1, 2010 to address Joshua's
objections to the court's decision and to the proposed findings. {Hearing Transcript
540 pg 3 Ln 3 (HT 540 pg 3 Ln 3)} During the hearing each objectionable item was
discussed, the court ruled on the language of each item, and finally instructed
Cassie's attorney to make the changes announced. (HT 540 pg 82 Ln 3)
On September 27, 2010, the parties were once again before the court to
address Joshua's contempt of existing orders. Having found Joshua in "contempt of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
6
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court for keeping Allie the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th of September and the 17th though the
20th when it wasn't his time to have the child," the Court sentenced him to 30 days in
jail and to pay a $1,000.00 fine. (HT 541 pg 51 Ln 20 - 24) The Court awarded Cassie
her attorneys fees associated with the OSC process (HT 541 pg 52 Ln 20 - 21), and
suspended Joshua's jail time but not the $1,000.00 fine, which Joshua has never paid.
(HT541 pg52Ln11 -19)
On December 13, 2010, the parties were once again before the Court to hear
several of Joshua's objections and Motions to include his Motion to Determine Equity
Amount and Payment Date (HT 541) and to hear Cassie's resistance to the many
objections. (TR481)
In response to Joshua's argument that the $32,000 awarded to Cassie for her
inheritance was to be included in the home equity, the Court ruled, "the [$32,000]
judgment awarded to Mrs. Clarke was independent of the equity in the house. So, Mr.
Buhler is correct. The equity is to be divided. There's a judgment separate and apart
from that."(HT 542 pg 6 Ln 4 -7)
On December 28, 2011, the court entered the Judgment for Attorney's Fees
and the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Order for Custody, Support, and Asset
Division under Decree of Divorce.
Joshua entered his notice of appeal on January 27, 2011.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should completely reject the appeal made by Joshua Clarke for at
least three reasons. First, Joshua totally failed to marshal the evidence in his
appellant's brief as required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 7
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Second, and the most egregious reason his appeal should be rejected is that
Joshua has either intentionally misstated or simply omitted the facts that do not
support his claims and in several places, such as his discussion of the division of
marital assets, Joshua blatantly lied to this Court about the facts established by the
trial court. Simply stated, Joshua has utterly failed in his duty of candor to this Court
and to the opposing party.
Finally, Joshua has appeared before this Court with unclean hands. Although
he complains loud and long about being fined and sentenced to 30 days in jail for his
refusal to abide the trial court's orders, he has never paid a dime towards the $1,000
fine, he never spent a minute in jail for the contempt, he still has not returned certain
items of personal property to Cassie as ordered several times by the trial court, and as
of this date, he still has not paid the $5,710.05 judgment for his children's medical,
daycare, and pre-school expenses awarded to Cassie at trial more than 18 months
ago. (TR 513)
In his brief to this Court, Joshua presents what he claims to be nine different
issues. However, Cassie believes there are actually only four issues before this Court.
Issue one concerns the division of marital assets, liabilities, and separate property
between the parties; the second is the award of attorney's fees to Cassie following
Joshua being found to be in contempt; the third is a procedural issue concerning the
denial of Joshua's Motion to Continue the trial for a third time; and the last issue
mentioned is the award to Cassie of the sole legal and physical custody of the parties'
two children.
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Be it nine, or four issues, Joshua has utterly failed to marshal the evidence
found in the case record to support any of his claimed issues on appeal, thus the
appeal should be denied in its entirety.
The Division of The Martial Estate was Equitable
At trial, the trial court properly determined the content of the martial estate to
essentially be the marital home. Because the parties failed to provide the court with
necessary information concerning the home's value, the trial court ordered the equity
in the home to be evenly split, announced two options for the transference of the
equity between the parties, and directed the parties to return with the needed home
value information.
Also at the conclusion of trial, the court determined that Joshua had purchased
a truck and boat before the parties were married and that at nine years of age, Cassie
had received a $40,000 inheritance and had kept the money separate until she
provided a majority of it to Joshua to pay off his truck and boat loans.
Using the guideline that marital property is ordinarily divided equally and
separate property such as premarital assets and inheritances will be awarded to the
acquiring party; the trial court awarded Joshua his truck and boat free of any interest
in Cassie. Because Cassie had allowed Joshua to use about $32,000 of Cassie's
inheritance to pay off his truck and boat loans and because Joshua stipulated that
Cassie should receive her inherited money back, the trial court awarded Cassie an
offset against Joshua's share of the home equity.
Months later, when the home equity was finally established to be $57,699, the
Court awarded each party $28,849.50 of home equity and then applied the previously
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awarded $32,000 offset for Cassie's inherited funds. Having found the offset
exceeded Joshua's equity interest, and hearing no plan from him to pay Cassie that
money, the trial court awarded the marital home to Cassie.
The trial court found the parties earned approximately the same $3,600 per
month and that the marital debt consisted of the first and second mortgages on the
home, a Teamsters credit card, and a debt of $15,951.00 due to Joshua's father for
previous assistance to the parties with their marital finances.
The trial court made an equitable distribution of the martial debts in relation to
the parties incomes and ability to pay monthly bills. Because Cassie was awarded the
home, she was assigned both mortgage balances totaling about $146,900. The
parties were ordered to pay one half of the debt to Joshua's father at the rate of no
less than $200 per month each and Joshua was ordered to assume the Teamsters
$7,320 credit card debt.
Simply stated, at the conclusion of the trial, the court made an equitable and
proper division of the assets and debts between Joshua and Cassie.
Joshua was contemptuous and there was no error in awarding attorney's fees
In direct violation of an Order drafted by his own attorney, Joshua kept the
parties' daughter away from her mother on two different occasions for a total of 8
days.
As far back as March 23, 2009, the Commissioner certified Joshua's contempt
because he refused to return items of personal property to Cassie as previously ordered.
As of this day, Joshua has still not returned all of Cassie's personal property.

10
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At the time of the parties' separation in 2008, Joshua was ordered to pay one half
of the children's uninsured medical and daycare expenses. Again, in January 2010, he
was ordered to pay his share of the children's daycare and medical expenses which
exceeded $7,500 by the time of trial in March 2010. Joshua simply refused to abide the
Court's order and as of this day, has still not paid these child related expenses.
In his brief, Joshua also failed to marshal the evidence that he was ordered not
to sleep with the children in his bed but that he has continued to do so as discussed in
the pending OSC on this issue. (TR 593)
There was no error in denying the motion to continue
Joshua fails to even mention to this Court his prior two Motions to Continue
which had both been granted by the trial court. Further, Joshua was given permission
to conduct a last minute custody evaluation only so long as the evaluation would be
complete in time for the trial that had been continued twice before.
Just eight business days before trial, Joshua, through his fourth attorney, made
the subject Motion to Continue based upon the evaluator's letter that he was busy and
needed more time to complete the evaluation.
The trial court properly denied Joshua's third Motion to Continue the trial.
The custody award was based upon sufficient findings
The trial court went to great lengths in its memorandum decision to list the
many and varied acts by the two parents, over a lengthy period of time that led the
court to its final decision concerning custody. Joshua challenged these findings on
two occasions before the final Order was entered by the trial court, yet he fails to
marshal the abundance of evidence that led to the Order of which he now complains.
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The trial court made many specific findings about Joshua's parenting history
and abilities but his brief mentions nothing about Joshua's refusal to allow his son to
have timely childhood inoculations until Cassie bribed him with a hot tub and hair
implants that he wanted. Likewise, his brief says nothing about Joshua's refusal to
allow his children to receive traditional medical care when suffering for several months
from a condition that was rapidly cured once proper medical care was received.
Joshua's brief also failed to state any of the detailed evidence that was before
the trial court concerning Joshua's "refusal to financially support his children despite Court
Orders . . . " or that the court had "very serious concerns for the health and safety of the
children" should Joshua be named as the custodial parent.
The trial court made extensive and detailed findings concerning its rational for
the custody award it entered. Therefore, lacking a valid argument fully supported by
citation to factual evidence, Joshua's challenge must fail and the custody award
should remain in place.
In sum, Joshua came to this appeal with completely unclean hands while
forcing Cassie to expend significant resources that she does not currently possess in
responding to Joshua's continuous campaign to keep her living under his control.
Cassie asks this Court, based upon her history of prevailing in the several
actions below, to allow her to recover both the award of fees she received from the
trial court and the fees she has incurred in responding to this appeal.

12
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ARGUMENT
LAND II.

THE DIVISION OF THE MARTIAL ESTATE WAS EQUITABLE.

"On appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the trial court's
decision to 'marshal' the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'"
Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 at 481 (Utah App. 1991J (citing Myers v. Myers, 768
P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1989).
"[P]arties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing
court will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings." Beesley v.
Harris (In re Estate of Beesley), 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994).
Concerning challenges to a trial court's findings of fact, the Advisory Committee
Notes to Utah to Rule 24 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure state:
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyerv. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d
1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact,
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate
themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In
order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."'
ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051,
1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)).
To reverse the trial courts' award of the marital property, Joshua has the
burden of compiling every scrap of competent evidence introduced during the trial
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which supports the property award to which he objects and then, using that evidence,
he must convince this Court that the trial court abused its very broad discretion in
making that property award to the parties.
However, in his brief Joshua has neither marshaled the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous,
citing instead only to the carefully selected evidence from the trial record that supports
the outcome he desires or in some areas, he simply created "facts" to support his
claims.

Division of Martial Estate
The first issue addressed in Joshua's brief claimed the trial court abused its
broad discretion when it awarded 100% of the marital estate to Cassie and negative
equity to Joshua.
Aside from failing to marshal the evidence before this Court, the problem with
this claim is that Joshua intentionally misstated several of the facts supporting his
argument resulting in a patently false claim of his award of negative equity.
For example, on page 16 of Joshua's brief he claims, "The Court then imposed on
Respondent, the sole obligation to repay all remaining debts consisting of a Teamster's credit
card of $9,800."
However, the trial court stated that "What I wanted to divide between them was the
debt as it existed at the day of trial." (HT 540 pg 81 Ln 24 - 25) The Teamsters debt on
March 3, 2010 (two weeks before trial), was $7,320, not the $9,800 debt balance
Joshua claimed on both page 12 and page 16 of his brief. (HT 538 pg 277 Ln 22 - pg
278Ln10)

14
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Joshua's intentional misquote on page 12, paragraph 12, that "the court ordered
Respondent to pay the balance of $9,800 solely without assistance by Petitioner" when he
knew the Court had actually ordered him to pay the $7,320 balance is but one
example of Joshua's dishonesty before this Court.
In his brief, Joshua also failed to list several assets in his possession or to even
mention to this Court that he kept all of the martial collectable coins that were
purchased using the marital Chase credit card, that became a major portion of the
debt due to Joshua's father, of which Cassie was ordered to pay one half. (HT 538 pg
171 Ln 2-16)
Another example is found in Joshua's brief, again on page 16, where Joshua
increased the claimed value of Cassie's property distribution by adding in a value of
$8,549 for her 401 (k), while intentionally failing to make any mention whatsoever of his
own UPS retirement account or of his $7,000 Roth IRA that he cashed in just two
months before trial. (HT 538 pg 323 Ln 1 - pg 324 Ln 4)
Not only did Joshua fail to marshal the evidence presented to the trial court on
the issue of retirement accounts, but both before and during the trial, he steadfastly
refused to divulge the actual amounts of his retirement benefits, which the trial court
found in its Memorandum Decision to be u very disturbing" (TR 278)
What Joshua also failed to tell this Court about the parties' retirement accounts
was that the parties agreed that each should keep their own retirement benefits. (TR
278) In light of this agreement, it was most disingenuous for Joshua to inflate the
value of Cassie's claimed property distribution by adding her retirement benefit to her

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 15
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

equity account while intentionally not mentioning, let alone accounting for his own
multiple retirement benefits.
In his negative equity argument, Joshua also chose not to mention to this Court
that he kept $10,000 worth of hair plugs Joshua received in exchange for allowing his
children to be immunized as described below. Nor did he mention that Cassie alone
was required to pay for Joshua's $10,000 worth of hair without contribution from him
because the money for the hair plugs came from the second mortgage that was
ordered to be Cassie's sole obligation to pay. (HT 538 pg 32 Ln 12-21) Joshua also
failed to list at trial or to mention to this Court any of the expensive personal property
he was awarded such as a $400.00 flour mill. (HT 538 pg 334 Ln 3 - 15)
The issue in this section is that Joshua intentionally misstated the factual
support for his appeal by many thousands of dollars, which outside of his failure to
marshal the evidence, should be fatal to the appeal of this issue.

Identification of Martial vs. Separate Property
The second issue Joshua raises in his Brief is that the trial court failed to fairly
divide the marital assets. However, throughout this portion of his brief, Joshua fails to
distinguish between separate and marital property.
On page of his brief, Joshua cites to Olsen v. Olsen 169 P.3d 765 (not listed in
his Cases list) when he correctly states that marital property is ordinarily divided
equally and separate property such as premarital assets and inheritances will be
awarded to the acquiring party.
Joshua also correctly states that there was no dispute that Cassie had received
a $40,000 inheritance when she was 9 years old and that Joshua was awarded the

16
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truck and boat that he had purchased before he married Cassie. Therefore, Cassie's
inheritance and Joshua's truck and boat were each identified as non-marital separate
property, were each ordered to be returned to the rightful owner and were each
properly excluded from the martial estate before any division of the marital property
took place.
In its Memorandum Decision based in part on Joshua's stipulation that Cassie
receive her inherited money back, the trial court ordered that the equity in the home be
divided equally and allowed a $32,000 offset to Cassie for a portion of her inheritance.
Although it had awarded the return to Cassie of $32,000 her inheritance, at the
time of its Memorandum Decision, the trial court did not have enough information
concerning the value of the home to award specific amounts of equity, so it ordered
the parties to gather that information and return to Court so that the home equity
award could be made based upon accurate information.
On December 13, 2010, the parties did return to the court and the parties
agreed that the home had $57,699.00 of equity, not counting any costs of a sale. That
resulted in each party being awarded $28,849.98 of home equity. Once the $32,000
offset was applied, that left Joshua owing Cassie $3,150.00, which she waived. (TR
516)
In its final order, the trial court made a very detailed finding on this issue when it
stated "The equal division of this total equity results in each party having a $28,849,985
interest in the home. Cassie has waived the $3,150.00 negative balance that results once her
$32,000 offset for her inherited funds is applied to Joshua's1Ainterest in the equity.
Therefore, Cassie is awarded the sole possession and ownership of the martial home located
at 223 West Regatta Lane, Stansbury Park, with no interest to Joshua." (TR 516)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 17
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Throughout his brief, Joshua repeatedly and intentionally fails to separate the
marital estate from the non-marital separate property. On page 23 of his brief for
example, Joshua states that "Without any consideration of separate contributions, each
party in this case should thus have received $28,350. However, the trial Court's calculation in
this case reimbursed to Petitioner her separate contribution to the truck and boat loans of
$32,000 resulting in an adjusted joint equity of $25,699. Under a usual division, both parties
would thus receive $12,850. However, the trial court exercised its discretion and awarded the
Respondent's $12,850 to Petitioner giving him $0 equity."
This statement to this Court is a bald faced lie and Joshua knows that because
he made this same argument to the trial court and was told that was not what had
been ordered. (HT 542 pg 6 Ln 4 - 7)
First, the determination that Cassie's $32,000 was her inheritance occurred at
the time of trial in March 2010, whereas the determination of the marital home equity
did not occur until 6 months later in December 2010. (HT 542 pg 4 Ln 5 - 11)
When Joshua made this same argument to the trial court, that the $32,000
awarded to Cassie for her inheritance was to be included in the home equity
calculation, the trial court specifically rejected that argument by stating "the [$32,000]
judgment awarded to Mrs. Clarke was independent of the equity in the house. So, Mr. Buhler
is correct. The equity is to be divided. There's a judgment separate and apart from that" (HT
542 pg 6 Ln 4 - 7).
The truth is that the trial court did award Joshua his $28,350 equal share of the
home equity once that value had been established. What Joshua intentionally does
not tell this Court is that the trial court went on to determine that the most fair way for
Cassie to receive her $32,000 back from Joshua was to allow her to take an offset

18
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against his share of the home equity, which exceeded the $28,350 Joshua had been
a w

• ; • ' • <

-.*••' 'ai=jr- :.

-'MM •

-larshal these lacts in s..-<p! *1 of his appeal along witl i

his in itei itior lal i i lisstater r lents ol tat t • -• In>111«I lit1 tatai in mm
li dppv mi ni mis isMie.

Determination of the separate nature of Cassie's inheritance and the value of assets
Josfitiid f

*

drs mi (Jdye 2fi

I hi1 hunt th ill 111# |niniiiiv isselk- HI lllliir riiiinl ill

estate were his tn ick and boat and the rai-r;». norne and that tht- 1<;HI ,:o .<•
Cassie $2, 100 ii i a bank a r m n

;

,,

../ar.ied

.>

awarded Cassie the health oaie fund w...ui« inay nave $2, ; X /// , t .

V TR

515,

As discussed above, the truck and boat were determined to be Joshua's

Therefore, these two assets were never inch ided in tt ie marital estate and there is no

e n i Ill: } 1:1 i e t

•j « ,

i

were not i n c , j o - i < r ne d i v i ^ c i . ~; ..'iartia; property by the T ,*I .- .,»:
Concerning the vain
thar

: ' . -v

*•* ••

^ T P a ^ described above, tl ie trial court made more
*

- stablish the valiie of the marital

home at $57,699.97. (TR 5 16) In additioi i, the parties stipulated to that vali \e in
December 2010.
riecause on page 40 of his brief, instead of citing the actual findings i i lade by It! ie

findings actually signed by the trial couit, and b e c a u s e he again used intentional
misstatements to support the outcome he desired, this issue should be rejected from
consideration by this C o i ir t.
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Cassie did carry her burden to establish her inheritance
Concerning Joshua's claim that the trial court never established the separate
nature of Cassie's inheritance, at trial Joshua's attorney asked Cassie "so you
maintained this inheritance since you were nine years old and is that still in your separate
name?" to which Cassie replied yes. (HT pg 99 Ln 1-5) Further, on no less than two
occasions when testifying before the Court, Joshua stipulated that he was willing to
pay Cassie the money she paid out of her inheritance for his truck and boat. (HT 538
pg 330 Ln 21 - pg 331 Ln 2) (HR 538 pg 290 Ln 16 - 21) Therefore, the trial court had
adequate evidence before it that Cassie has used a major portion of her pre-marital
inheritance to the sole benefit of Joshua and that he had stipulated to the money's
return to Cassie.
Joshua also failed to marshal the evidence considered by the trial court in
making its determination that Cassie had used her inheritance to benefit Joshua and
in the process Joshua made additional misstatements of fact.
For example, on page 27 of his brief, Joshua claims that "In the first instance the
Respondent disputed Petitioner's testimony of her contribution to his loans of $32,000 (T.
03/17/10, pg 287)". In fact, what was actually said was:
Q Isn 't it true she paid $23,000 for your boat out of her inheritance ?
A She paid something to pay off the boat. The amount I'm not exactly sure without
proof
Q What about your truck?
A

Yes, she did pay that off also.

Q Are you willing to give her back her 23,000?
A If she shows proof.
Q Sir, are you willing to give her back her $23,000?
MS. MARELIUS: Objection, two objections to his hostile attitude which is intended
to upset my client. It is not necessary to do that. It's argumentative and
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bullying. No* 2, asked and answered. He doesn't know how much it was and it
wasn't 23,000.
THE COURT: I don't think the attitude is foi that purpose and yot // client avoided
answering the question which calls for a second 01 le He doesn't answer
whether he would do that or not. He throws his owi ? question in instead and that's
what's caused a whole bunch of delay and how this is working, Mr Buhlet can
jtat dgau

* u.i *''v* uuestion

MS. MARE LI US Sa\ .
M

W- Rt tJ>,r> -\*
*i • — ' -

f

; v ,> rimit neods to answer the questions.

'• ^

.,

nuswei yes, i i :), I don't kno\ i or.

• '; ;. f >/ u'.'/«.v -^ <?/* *r/.;
'»»;.•*

- .0' •

!

r

• / le said I doi ftki io\ i low
- fs a terrible questioi i ) hat's

i ? ot
VIR, BUHLER:

I'll t ephrase the question,

BY MR. BUHL ER:
Q

Would you pay her back the amount of money that she paid out of her inheritance
towards your boat?

\

V es /1 vould.

" •'

Q Are you willing to pay back the amount of money that she paid out of her
inheritance towards your truck?
y\

Yes, I would.
(HT 538 pg 289 In i i - pg 290 Ln 2 1)

' N o w before this Court, J o s h u a intentionally misstates what w a s actually said
dii nil nin 11 the Ihrulll Hi • spying ho tlispukMj I mi lo«,liinon\ ' almul her separate conlnbutions
to his loans, when he actually agreed that she had m a d e such contributions, but that
he ": imply did not know the precise amounts
J o s h u a also tries to inti o d u c e evidence of lUef

-iyments in this Coin t that was

not presented at trial and w a s specifically rejected hv "'-r H a l con irt in it Memorandum
Decision of "ippilei i il n i ll'i

-"iHili ( I P M\\)

VW)
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Worse than all of that, on page 26 of his brief, Joshua just plain lied to this
Court when he stated "the actual boat and truck loan payoffs that totaled only $14,960"
when the documents Joshua submitted to, but that were rejected by the trial court,
showed the total boat and truck payoff to be $24,859.93. (TR 69 - 68)
The $9,900 difference between what Joshua told this Court and the loan payoff
amounts he tired to provide to the trial court is another serious misstatement of fact by
Joshua. This dishonesty should be sanctioned by the award of the attorney's fees
Cassie has incurred in responding to this issue in addition to the Court declining to
consider this issue on appeal.

Comingling argument not applicable to Cassie's inheritance
In his argument on this issue Joshua continues to falsely claim that the trial
court did not award an equal division of the marital estate (marital home equity) and
once again as discussed above, falsely states that the trial court awarded Cassie
100% of the martial estate while awarding Joshua negative value.
Also once again, Joshua failed to marshal the ample evidence before the trial
court when it made its findings. In this section of his brief, Joshua failed to make a
single citation to the trial record.
Joshua certainly did not mention to this Court that while testifying under oath,
he stipulated that the inherited money Cassie had paid towards his truck and boat
should be returned to her and that he was willing to return that money to her thereby
creating a stipulation to the effect. (HT 538 pg 289 Ln 12 - pg 290 Ln 21) Joshua chose
not to present any evidence at trial about his use of Cassie's inherited money, stating
only he did not know how much it was. Rather, after the trial court's decision was
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announced, J o s h u a then produced soi ne numbers coi icerning the loan amoi ints that
hi mi iw lues h Iinnnrh h,

" 11 $!* l»i)M.

J o s h u a also did not mention to this (.f.,i - ' M I
he failed to list tl lat he was in possess*.

!

. s w o ; • * -. - 1 1- z\ar^

i

in of nair piugs 1 . ' d ^ -

was ordered to solely pay foi as part of her second n lortgage (HT 53•? n ) ^ L... .v,22x

AU

at he was in the sole possession of collectable coins that had a substantial cost

which Cassie was ordered to pay one half ( 1 R 538 pg 332 I n 12 • 20), or that he was

he sii i iply "forgot" to put the items on tf le pi operty list. (HT 538 pg 334 Ln 3

15)

As with the above discussed issues, because Joshua failed in any manner
whatsoever to i i lai si lal the evidence conceri 11111 lg tl lis issi le, this Coi irt shoi jld decline,
in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings/" Beesiey v Harris ( In re
Estate of Beesiey), 383 P.2d 1343, 1349 (I It; 1! 1 199 1 )

HI-

JOSHUA C L A R K E WAS CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE C O U R T S ORDERS
AND THERE WAS NO ERROR IN AWARDING A i I ORNEY'S FEES
T h e Utah Legislature has provided statutory contempt authority, s e e Utah C o d e
A n n '} 78B-(>-302 i7!0G8l ' hii.h h >gethi:M

iililii I I! IK is ::: :)i 1 111: 1 1 ::)i 11 law, provides the basis 1 r a

Utah court's power to hold offenders in contempt. S e e Vot ? Hake, 759 P.2d at 11666/

I Hah C o d e section /8B-6-3U2 provides, .•
(1) W h e n a contempt is committed in the immediate view ar id pr esence of the
court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily,, A n order shall be
ni ni iade, reciting the facts occurring ii 1 the in in lediate view and presence of the cc '
1 he order shall state that the person proceeded against is gi lilty of a contempt and
shall be punished as prescribed in Section 78B-6-310.
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(2) When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of
the court or judge, an affidavit or statement of the facts by a judicial officer shall be
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt.
In addition to coming before this Court having never served a minute of jail time
nor having ever paid a dime of the $1,000.00 fine levied for his contempt, Joshua has
not marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's finding of contempt, he has
not demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous, and more important, he
has, in his brief, once again changed the truth of the matter to a fiction that he desires
to have this Court believe.
On page 32 of his brief, Joshua states "Respondent appeals the Order on Order to
Show Cause entered by the Court December 13, 2010 holding him in contempt for improperly
keeping the parties' daughter for parent time to which he was not entitled from September 6,
2010 at 7:00 p.m. until Friday September 10, 2010 at 5:30 p.m., a period of 4 days."
(emphasis added)
Joshua falsely claims he was held in contempt for keeping the parties' daughter
for a period of 4 days. A review of the transcript of that hearing shows that the trial
court stated "I'm finding Mr Clarke in contempt of court for keeping Allie the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th of
September and the 17th through the 20th when it wasn't his time to have the child." (HT 541 pg 51
Ln20-pg52Ln19)
It is clear from the transcript that Joshua failed to point out to this Court that the
trial court found Joshua had kept the parties daughter away from her mother on two
different occasions for a total of 8 days, not the single occasion lasting 4 days Joshua
has asked this Court to believe. This is just one more intentional misstatement made
by Joshua to lessen the appearance of his wrongdoing.
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Joshua goes oi i to claim on page 34 of his bi ief that "It is clear from the testimony

com t He also did / lot show a pattern of contempt / ior any "obstinacy" to result in a finding of willful
contempt"
Because Joshua has again completely failed to marshal the evidence befor e
the

ol Cdiih-Miipl and "obstinac* "' thai hi , >

has displayed throughout this divorce action is in order
Beginning with the Cor i imissioner's certification of his conten ipt on Mai cl i 23,
2009, because he refused to return items of personal pi opei ty to Cassie as pi eviously
ordered
n *

r r o

" ^ and 287), thi? ° ~ ir+ should know that as of this date, Joshua has still not

i

Although the ^:,ur ^ jered Josin a in January 20 in to pay his share ot the
children's day,

- *•

*

Joshua simply r^tu^.i \n .^hi'j- ^

:xceeded$,i bOOl^ lho turn , Il lual,
^^,. «

,<

its Memorandum Decision following

trial, the ti ial com t found Josi lua in contempt for this refusal as stated :~ + k ^ n r ~~: n ~
"When the parties separated, the respondent closed all the bariK a

* *

credit cat ds out of petitioner "s name, at id left her without any mean.-*

JS

- .•

3

*.^v„ ; -xc.epf

friends and family: After a Couii Order was entered rm^uiring him <
' > sun^c^r >• children,

health ca^i e^ptri^os « ) / has *efuseu u,- nny his share of work-related daycare, despite
a §pecjfjc

QrcjQf jf 1 JQf

n

,

. "" '

t

'

- ,'*.\

•

•!

payments. His willful and kixMitiy tetijs.ii -u m bu esur *„• j "itKh'h] o; conte > ? of
Court for his failure to make those payments," (TR 289)
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As demonstrated by the April 19, 2010, Memorandum Decision (TR 289), Joshua
falsely claims on page 35 of his brief that the trial court finding him in contempt on
September 27, 2010, "was the first violation by Mr. Clarke . . . "
Joshua failed to tell this Court that he was ordered not to sleep with the children
in his bed (HT 538 pg 308 Ln 8 - pg 309 Ln 7) but still does so as discussed in the
pending OSC on this issue. (TR 593)
Despite Joshua's claims, the record is replete with facts supporting the findings
of contempt against him. For more than three years, Joshua simply refused to comply
with the orders of the trial court and yet he appears before this Court claiming he
should not have been held in contempt by that court any time.
In his appeal, Joshua has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, this Court should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
district court and assume that the factual findings are sufficiently supported by the
evidence presented at trial. Joshua's complete failure to marshal the evidence when
challenging the trial court's findings must be fatal to his appeal of this issue.

Award of Fees
On page 36 of his brief Joshua claims that Cassie's attorney fee affidavit is
overbroad and included charges for such things as drafting the Divorce Decree and
that the "vast majority of fees being requested have no relationship to the Order to Show
Cause issue on September 27."
Again, Joshua failed to marshal the evidence in the record and again misstated
the true facts of the situation. Joshua simply failed to inform this Court that this
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incident of the Coi irt finding Joshua in contei npt on Septei nber 27, 2010 actually
stalled IAIIIIMMII in i »M ho^nini i nni,i>ih IU Jn\!nj,i «>, i mm urn.) iiHu -HI! In tiiiininl'i ii'tmii llii
children to Cassie was scheduled for July V? 9(1)0 att-*r an O C S with it si ipporting
doci imentation was draftee

.

-• •. -.. :.,,•,

icket for entry on Ji n i 3 1 i;:

2010)
After conferring with the parties' counsel on July 8 th the Court contini i 3d that

was rescheduled for August 2, 2010

At that time, Cassie and her attorney appeal ed

represented to the Court by phone that she had she never received notice of the
hearing.

• •

Because Joshua had ni not i eti irned the cl mil ::li en i tc Cassie c j i h ilh 3 1, 20 10, she
was forced to seek and was granted a Writ of Assistance to help Cassie retrieve hei
child! ei i am id til r B I iea.ii ii ig was i esc! ledi iled foi * :!* i igi ist - I , 20 10.

-

••

At the August 4 th hearing, all pai ties were present and the parties entered ai i
agreement concerning exter ided parent time to ii iclude that each parent woi jld have
th e children

one

week at a time and that Joshua would have an additional 2 y eeks ii i

the summer of 2011. loshua's attorney was directed to draft the Order memorialiizii ig
this agreement.
On August 9 2010 the Court held a phone conference with the parties'
i.omi'.i-.'l rind »il Ill

• . ,->t in jiJiiitHiii nil IIIMIIIII] Iof September I' "' to heai J arious

issues, to include Cassie's allegations that Joshua repeatedly failed to timely i etui i i
tl le : I iiildren aftei periods of scl leduled parent time.
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On September 1, 2010, at the scheduled time, Cassie was present with her
attorney but Joshua was not present. Joshua's attorney was present and represented
to the Court that he was on his way and expected to arrive soon. Although the
hearing lasted from 13:36 until well after 15:30, Joshua never did appear.
At that time, Joshua's attorney presented her proposed Order concerning
parent time. The Court made its "Final Ruling" that, for this year, Joshua was to have
the children for the Labor Day holiday and that Joshua would return the children to
their mother's home no later than 7:30 pm on September 6, 2010. (TR 333) The
parties' attorneys each signed that Order. However, in spite of the direct order written
and signed by his attorney, Joshua failed to return the parties' daughter to Cassie on
September6, 2010.
Another OCS was issued on September 8, 2010 alleging Joshua was in
contempt for this failure to timely return the daughter and the OSC hearing was
scheduled for September 20, 2010. (TR 356)
On or about September 16th, Joshua's attorney filed a Motion to Continue the
hearing from September 20, 2010 at 9:00 am, stating she had a calendar conflict that
morning in Salt Lake City. Cassie's attorney agreed to move the hearing until the
afternoon to resolve the calendar conflict, but on September 17th, Joshua's attorney
contacted the Court again requesting a continuance of the September 20th hearing.
The Court ruled that the hearing would not be continued if Mr. Clarke still had
the children with him. Late in the day on September 17th, Joshua's attorney contacted
the Court Clerk and they together contacted Cassie's attorney requesting that he
agree to continue the hearing from the afternoon of September 20th until a later date.
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In response to that request from Joshua's atton iey, Cassie's attorney agreed
that sin luny as Insliiin li.nl isnluiiitf MI HIN paities < J - -* • <
i • l • 11 i In Cassie |jy i1 ,311 pin mi
September 17, 2.010, then he would not object to the .oquest to continue the O S C
hearing i intil Septen iber 2 J IJ"
O n September 18, 20 10, C a s s i e ' s attorney w a s i lotified tfiaf J o s h u a h ; 1 tru- i
to return the daughter to Cassie on the evening of September 17, 2010. C a s s i e ' s altoiiif-1' '

null's IIaiIn Hire1 \\ ilelivm

i

the daughter a s agreed between c o u n s e l He also notified J o s h u a ' s attorney that
because Joshua had i efused to abide til le agreement m i lade the previous day, he
expected to s e e her and hei client at 1:30 oi i the afternoon of September 20th for the
hearrg as ix ha~! r ~ v i o u s l y h e e ~ scheduled.

.iffo'i

*

s <eithe- Joshua *

.* > - m . a ' s a t l o «•--

'.-rst

' Cassie ? attor iey

is i|j'iM sniilnll In 11 ic i mill Hut! Il"1 '"Ill i Luke hind lyaiiti leiiivtsil lo lelumi the dauqlliitei as
had b e e n agreed between counsel and that J o s h i ia's attorney had been notified on
September 18th to be at the hearing or i Septembei 2(
respondent and his counsel, the Court rescSp-ms- iJ

"* absence of the

,l

• •

2010 and issued a minute Order prohibiting Josrm * •:.
()S(

--wing parent time until the

linannq was i i hinplnh M I.
Oi i September 27 th the parties were ai" * •

moss, ex:ai i iiiiiiafii in U stum i i

and ther

i-

.our nea-'u dire- I *nd
i.^o * - -,., s mpt rinding

against Joshua and awarded C a s s i e her attorney's fees. (TR 376-374)
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The complained of Affidavit of Fees requests a judgment only for attorney's
fees Cassie incurred throughout this 4 month period of time that were directly related
to the OSC process that finally culminated on September 27, 2010 with an Order for
fees as described above.
Contra to Joshua's claim, of the total $6,825.00 in fees charged between June
1, 2010 and October 3, 2010, the fees for drafting the degree and other actions
completed during this time period, not directly related to this OSC process, were not
requested nor awarded in the $3,129.00 judgment. (TR 374, 370 -369)
Clearly, each and every fee requested had a direct "relationship to the Order to
Show Cause issue on September 27," not just the "vast majority of fees being requested" as
alleged by Joshua.
The award of fees to Cassie was based on adequate and detailed evidence
which Joshua never successfully disputed at the trial court level and his challenge
made to this Court was not supported by the marshaling of any credible evidence,
thus the award of attorney's fees to Cassie by the trial court should stand as entered.

THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO CONTINUE
As with the briefing of his other issues, Joshua once again purposefully fails to
marshal the evidence in the record that provides ample justification for the trial court to
deny his third Motion to Continue. Joshua fails to even mention his prior two Motions
to Continue (TR 90 & 99) which had both been granted by the trial court.
Joshua certainly did not mention in his brief that the Custody Evaluator was
appointed with the specific requirement that the evaluation be completed in time for
trial on March 17, 2010. (TR 149)
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The history of this issue which was not marshaled in Joshua's brief includes the
fach that { 1} Ji isliiiii.r- *» ;i L
a n y cus tody

in<;H U! IM mil Russell II II m
l n 1 c• I i n^'i n- miesli-'il

evaluation prior to his withdrawal in January 2009 • •' p vo. m**- {2}

Joshi ia's second counsel of record Grant Morrison, never requested any cuslody

2009, the Commissioner conducted a pre-trial conference with Joshua's second
counsel oil u CUIIJ

/Im III in 'UiilllaJ in a pinlii ill Urdm bi iiiny ntileiod mi iepLtiiiibt i I I

2009 wherein the Commissioner did not certify the issi ie of child custody, as only the
parent time schedilie once the older child entered set- -m vas discussed or certified
for trial. (TR pq Miif, {4} tlwii
certified tha ht - M
t\

IE

AJi .>

. ,

• \ Hlnbr ;\ >>()( - * -.

jmpleted all disc^/«-r«
,

s -ittmn^ '> ini i I MM

R f,q 82); {5} that on Octobe

.

)j, (b) in.

'9

;

I,

oe .

2009, Grant Morrison requested a continuation of the ti ial ( rR pg 90); {7} that a
hearing was scheduled for December 7, 2009 (TR pg 92); {8} that on December "*
2

, i r i v I HI'-ie n
i n
i appeal nil as Joshua's, lliiiiiinil alloum1 nil inuonll ai n
i -

of litigation, requested to conduct a deposition even though his predecessor counsel.
had certified discovery tc: be compl*

,h

. „

,.s - request, t» ial

was rescheduled until January 22, 2010 to allow time foi Josllua's iequested
deposition which never occurred (TR 93); {10} that just 12 business days before the
trial MS schedule) I In of i in

Inshua's til unit I IMMIIN-'Y nil mn
i i mrt rpi|imsted aum ill lint

contii luation of the trial (TR pg 99), stating that Joshua had suddenly desired the
-.:..*.
bifurcated the divorce and the custody evaluation issue was discussei
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between counsel and the trial judge and that Joshua's third attorney of record
stipulated that Joshua would fully fund the custody evaluation and assured the Court
that the evaluation would be completed in the following two months before the
scheduled trial date of March 17, 2010 (TR 114); {12} that the Court memorialized this
ruling in the Order of February 9, 2010, drafted by Joshua's third attorney of record,
which states in the judge's handwriting "The child custody evaluation shall be finalized
by the date of trial in this matter, March 17, 2010." (TR 149); {13} that just 8 business
days before the trial on March 4, 2010, Joshua's fourth attorney of record Suzzanne
Marelius filed yet another Motion to Continue (TR 182); {14} that the Court held a
phone conference concerning Joshua's third Motion to Continue on March 8, 2010, at
which time his third Motion to Continue was denied wherein the court stated in its
Notes, that all parties were aware of the requirement to be ready for trial on March 17,
2010. (TR 183)
Trial was then conducted on March 17 2010 as scheduled and again on March
31, 2010. Joshua's third Motion to Continue is the subject of this appeal issue.
Although it appears that Joshua's fourth attorney failed to obtain any transcript
of that crucial court hearing of January 19, 2010, when the parties were actually
divorced, it does not seem to matter, as he has failed to marshal any of the other facts
stated above. Joshua's brief simply states that his Motion to Continue was denied, but
he never mentioned the two preceding Motions to Continue that were granted by the
trial court.
Without any citation to the record, Joshua mentions a letter from the custody
evaluator that allegedly states he can't complete the evaluation prior to March 17,
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2010, but he failed to mention the Order of February 9, 2010, which states "

2010.

(TR 149)

The

' •• '

Joshua's citation to tl le Gi iffitt is \ / lammond

560 f >.2d 13 75 and Boice v.

Marble 982, P 2d 568 in his brief to support his position that he -•.honlrl have lieeni
granted a third continuance, are not supportive of his claim.
^ T h e Griffith* >

Hnm MH

Jaledl " | H | yu\\\\ r mol q u a l e d a i oiniiliiiiiiiiaiiii c

as a matter of right, but rather as an act of discretion by the coui t and the inability of
counsel to be present at the time set foi trial does not necessarily entitle the client to a
continuance." Id. I I le Griffiths action had nothing whatsoever to do with the testimr n\
of a custody evaluator or any expert testimony as the case concerned the enli y ot a
default ||i(dj"|ii]eiiil d i m flu » dedeiid nil " nun Hppe.llHIn t a! lliill

Although J o s h u a mis-cited his second case Boice v: Marble as 982 F ?d 566
rati M .1 Ihan i i y j , lJI J d bbd, the e s s e n c e of that case concerns the substitution of one
medical expert for another expert two months before the scheduled trial date.
W h e r e a s Joshua's third Motion to Continue w a s made just 8 business clays befoi e the
trial and after his thud atlnnii « / n\ tm imill had '.tipullatml la the ireffnireinenf llh ruslml\ "
evaluator report was to be ready toi fnal on March 17, /'0 111 I
i s hi 1 , in.tliilil I [HHst'iil ain wxpiMl s lestimnii', al III! ill

Ir

but fails to mention that he chose not to secure that expert for the 18 months between
(he II it II miay of (lite case and the Ihinail,
J o s h u a ' s claim that "it was error for the tnr-x mc^ iu ue/
one month to allow completion

- t - r , - ••

of the evaluation" is an intentional misstatement of fact
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in that it is an intentional omission of the evidence before the court concerning the
previous two continuances that had been granted. As such, this Court must reject
Joshua's demand to find error and should punish this dishonesty with the award of the
attorney's fees incurred by Cassie in responding to this issue.

V.

THE CUSTODY AWARD WAS BASED UPON SUFFICIENT FINDINGS
Concerning the custody award of the children, Cassie believes this is most
important and should have been discussed first. Her position is that the trial court

went to great lengths in its Findings to list the many and varied acts by the two
parents, over a lengthy period of time, that led the court to its final decision concerning
custody.
Once again, in his brief, Joshua simply creates facts in the attempt to support
his position. Concerning the issue of physical custody, Joshua states on his page 41
that the trial court failed to give "proper weight to Respondents clearly established role as
the primary care taker of the children during the marriage"
However, Joshua fails to provide the Court with a single citation to the record
concerning the "Respondent's clearly established role as the primary care taker of the
children during the marriage" Joshua gave no citation to the record because the record
says nothing whatsoever about who was the primary caregiver for the Clarke children.
In fact, on page 41 of his brief he even complains that "the court failed to identify a
primary caretaker in any fashion in his findings"
Although Joshua did marshal the fact that Cassie was awarded the "primary
physical custody of the two children" at the time of separation in 2008 (TR 44), common
sense would dictate the lack of designation of one parent as the primary caregiver
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given the parties' lengthy history of shared care giving. This history was clearly stated
in the trial court's findings:
During the marriage and through the separation, the parties have worked shifts which are
approximately opposite each other, allowing them to avoid surrogate care for the children.
Cassie has been a Wal-Mart driver coordinator, working Tuesday through Friday from 5:30
a.m. to 4:00 p.m. This has been a consistent schedule for at least five years. Joshua has
worked for UPS from 5:00 to 6:30 p.m. to 4:00 a.m., which has also been consistent for
several years. Therefore, during the marriage he took care of the children during the day,
and she had them overnight. The evidence was in dispute with respect to whether or not
Joshua fell asleep when he should have been watching the children during the day, and
whether or not he took care of the home. (TR 522)
Joshua is correct in his citations to case law concerning custody awards, as
exampled by the statement "In considering competing claims to custody between fit parents
under the "best interests of the child" standard, considerable weight should be given to which
parent has been the child's primary caregiver" Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah
1986), but other that his self-serving claim, he fails to provide this Court with any
evidence that he was ever established to be the primary care taker of the children.
Neither party can point to case law that establishes who is the primary care
taker of the children when the two parents each provide care to the children while the
other parent is at work.
Also on page 41 of his brief, Joshua tries to mislead this Court by claiming that
he "was the only parent who could continue to provide personal care for the children while
petitioner needed surrogate care due to her work schedule." Given the undisputed fact that
Joshua works a 40 hour week over 5 days, he would obviously need to provide over
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40 hours of surrogate care each week, the same as Cassie who works her 40 hours
during 4 days each week.
Returning to the issue of the trial court's findings, Joshua falsely claims the
findings made by the trial court only reflect only parenting style and parental character
but did not identify the parenting ability or history of the parties, which is precisely what
the trial court findings did describe.
The trial court made many specific findings about Joshua's parenting history
and abilities in its Memorandum Decision but his brief mentions nothing about
Joshua's refusal for 2 years to allow his child to receive timely childhood inoculations
until Cassie bribed him with $10,000 in hair plugs and a $15,000 hot tub that he
wanted. (TR 526 - 525) (HT 538 pg 16 Ln 13 - 24) (HT 538 pg 17 Ln 14-18) Although
Joshua tried at trial to deny any connection between his hair plugs and his finally
allowing his children to receive their childhood immunizations, Joshua was forced on
cross examination to admit he got hair plugs in July 2007 and the kids got their
immunizations starting in July 2007. (HT 538 pg 212 Ln 20 - pg 215 Ln 20)
Joshua's brief also fails to mention the trial court's findings concerning Joshua's
refusal to allow traditional medical care for his child. The trial court found that Josh
saw his child had an open, festering rash for about 6 months and refused to allow
Cassie to take the child to a medical physician. (HT 538 pg 15 Ln 2 - pg 16 Ln 17)
After months of watching her child suffer, Cassie, over Joshua's objections, took the
child to a medical and Joshua was furious even though the prescribed medicine
rapidly cleared up the rash. (TR 525) The trial court also found that Joshua had
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stated his willingness to block immunizations for the children if he were given joint
legal custody.
Although Joshua did mention his version of several trial court Findings
beginning on page 40 of his brief, Joshua left unmentioned the trial court's statement:
Cassie shall be awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children subject to Joshua's
expanded parent time as outlined below. This ruling is based upon very serious concerns
for the health and safety of the children; and Joshua's refusal to financially support his
children despite Court Orders, his inability to compromise; his refusal to cooperate; his
inflexibility, which appears to be a factor in his entire life, not just parenting; his attitude
toward medical treatment, combined with this inflexibility, refusal to compromise and
difficulty making decisions could result in serious harm to the children if he were the
custodial parent As noted above, he testified that if he had joint legal custody, he would
be able to block immunizations, so he shouldn't have legal custody either The Court
makes this ruling cognizant of the fact that Cassie has ignored Court Orders also, and has
blocked parent time between Joshua and the children, therefore, the parent time schedule
needs to be inflexible, with as little ability to deviate on the part of the custodial parent as
possible."(TR 521)
Joshua also failed to marshal the court's stated Ve/y serious concerns for the
health and safety of the children" should Joshua be the custodial parent. (TR 521)
As noted in the statement above, the trial court stated another of the reasons
for awarding Cassie the children's custody was Joshua's "refusal to financially support
his children despite Court Orders . . . " (TR 521) Further, the trial court found that:
When the parties separated, Joshua closed all the bank accounts, took the credit cards out
of Cassie's name, and left her without any means of support, except friends and family.
After a Court Order was entered requiring him to support his children, he has paid child
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support as ordered, however, he has not paid his share of work-related daycare despite a
specific Order in January of 2010 requiring him to immediately start making such payments.
His willful and knowing refusal to do so results in a finding of contempt of Court for his
failure to make those payments. (TR 524)

Custodial Interference
In his brief, Joshua complains that the trial court failed to give sufficient weight
to Cassie's conviction for custodial interference. But again, Joshua failed to tell this
Court the complete story that was before the trial court when it made its findings. For
example, Joshua never mentioned his was charged with crime unlawful detainer on
Cassie. (HT 538 pg 226 Ln 4-8), Joshua simply lied to this Court when he
paraphrased his findings on his page 40 (b) to state that Cassie was found guilty of
custodial interference "for withholding the children from Respondent for three months"
when the trial court findings actually stated:
It became very clear through all the evidence that during litigation, Mr Clarke had a difficult time
making decisions (with his father very heavily involved in all of his actions and all of his
decision making). Even important health and safety issues regarding his children are areas
where he would not be able to make a decision in a short period of time, even if it was

required. In addition, the Respondent testified to a strong belief in right and wrong which he was
unwilling or unable to compromise.
This is illustrated by the numerous parent time problems the parties had throughout
their separation. The best example happened at Christmas of 2009. Where after more
than a month of not seeing his children (Cassie refused to let the children go with him after
his demand for the children for all of the month of November). She kept them from him for
that month, December, and part of January, claiming that if he had the children he would
not return them). Counsel for both parties worked diligently to arrange some Christmas
visitation for Joshua, and arrived at a stipulated agreement where he would have New Year's
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Eve and part of Christmas Day. Josh wanted significantly more time than the negotiated terms
and showed up at Christmas Eve, which was outside of the terms of the Agreement and he was
refused parent time. Mr. Clarke's attitude that it had to be his way or not at all was immature,
ridiculously stubborn, and hurtful to the children. (TR 525 - 524)
Concerning the October and December parent time problems, Joshua had
demanded in writing to Cassie that he be allowed to take the children for a continuous
four weeks in October 2009. Cassie had refused his demands citing to the Utah Code
concerning extended parent time and the children's young age.
When Cassie offered to allow the children to be with Joshua for Halloween, he
said if he got the kids on October 31, he would keep the children till end of November.
(HT 538 pg 142 Ln 1-16) Upon hearing this threat from Joshua, Cassie left her home
with the children to avoid any conflict between her and Joshua in front of the children.
Joshua came to her house, found her not at home, and then called the police
saying Cassie had interfered with his parent time and demanded she be cited for
custodial interference, which she was.
Joshua failed to tell this Court that the prosecution dismissed the charges
against Cassie as soon as they learned of the court had ordered parent time to follow
UCA 30-3-35, which listed Halloween as Cassie's holiday in the 2009 odd year.
Joshua also failed to tell this Court that the trial court confirmed it was Cassie's holiday
time for Halloween 2009 and Joshua knew it when he called the cops and demanded
she be charged with custodial interference. (HT 538 pg 306 Ln 2 - 20)
Joshua's brief repeatedly cites to Cassie's single conviction of custodial
interference but never mentions his refusal to have any contact with his children
whatsoever during the Christmas holidays in 2009 because he did not like the terms of
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the stipulation entered by his counsel concerning the holiday visitation schedule and
because he did not want to transport the children both ways. (HT 538 pg 263 Ln 1-13)
Joshua testified that he knew of the stipulation between counsel concerning the
Christmas parent time, (TR 538 pg 294 Ln 8 - 21), and that he decided he did not
want to abide the stipulation it because he wanted more time with the children. (HT
538 pg 237 Ln 15 - pg 238 Ln 4)
Joshua admits that when he called the police, he knew what the parent time
stipulation was and that he still refused to promise to bring the children back as
agreed. (HT 538 pg 294 Ln 8 - 21) In response to Joshua's refusal to agree to return
the children as had been agreed, Cassie refused to let them leave with Joshua on
Christmas eve which resulted in her plea in abeyance for custodial interference. (HT
pg 178 L n 7 - p g 1 8 0 - L n 13)
On another subject, Joshua said he planned as a routine to keep tending the
children for 10 hours after having only 3 hours of sleep following his overnight work
shift each night. (TR 538 pg 293 Ln 2 - 25) Joshua also testified that "/ can't do it
[physical custody] alone" meaning he would have to have surrogate care, were he
named as the custodial parent. (TR 538 pg 329 Ln 3 - 19)
The trial court had all of this information before it when it made its custody
award.
Concerning the actual findings about custody, the trial court stated:
With respect to specific findings regarding custody, the Court finds that each of the parties
love the children; the children have good relationships with each parent; that neither parent
has shown much respect for Court Orders, unless they believed the Court Order benefited
them; that there is some concern about Cassie moving a boyfriend into the house; smoking
in front of the children, which may not be in the best interests of their health and welfare; that
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the parent most likely to act in the best interests of the children is Cassie with respect to
medical decisions, health care decisions, and with the ability to be flexible and compromise
to promote the children's best interest; and that Joshua lacks the ability to compromise,
make good decisions quickly, and wouldn't act in the children's best interest with respect to
their health and safety Neither parent is likely to allow the children frequent and continuing
contact with the other parent, absent Court Orders. Joint legal custody could not possibly
work with parents who have this much animosity toward each other. The Utah Advisory
Guidelines shall be part of the divorce Decree. (TR 521 - 520)

There is no definitive checklist of factors to be used for determining custody
since such "factors are highly personal and individual, and do not lend themselves to
the means of generalization employed in other areas of the law...." Moon v. Moon, 790
P.2d52, 54 (Utah App. 1990).
It is obvious from the record of this matter that the trial court very carefully
considered which parent was "most likely to act in the best interests of the child,
including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial
parent as the court finds appropriate." Id. The trial court clearly weighed each factor
and made a careful determination of each factor it considered applicable before
making the custody award.
Joshua asks the Court of Appeals to completely overlook an extensive record
that is heavily laden with incidents of his self-contradictory testimony and outright
refusal to cooperate with the court process on several issues. Joshua's claim that the
custody award should be negated based upon the lack of the trial court to specifically
identify the primary caretaker when both parents shared this duty and the alleged lack
of weight given to Cassie's conduct, while completely ignoring his own conduct must
be denied.
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Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees Upon Appeal
"In divorce actions where the trial court has awarded attorney fees and the
receiving spouse [prevails] on the main issues, we generally award fees on appeal."
(quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002 UTApp 83,1J 43, 45 P.3d 176), Stonehocker v.
Stonehocker, 2008 UTApp 11, f[ 11, 176 P.3d 476 (alteration in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) is the controlling statute and states in pertinent part:
"In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees
upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense."
When awarding fees under subsection (2), the court "may disregard the financial need
of the moving party." Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah Ct. App. 1994);
see also Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
The guiding factor in fee awards under subsection (2) is whether the party
seeking an award of fees substantially prevailed on the claim. Fee awards under
subsection (2) serve no equalizing function but allow the moving party to collect fees
unnecessarily incurred due to the other party's recalcitrance. See Finlayson, 874 P.2d
843 at 850-51.
In Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921), the Utah Supreme Court
discussed the rationale for awarding attorney fees when one party "refuses to comply
with the requirements of [an order or] decree" such that the other party "is compelled
to bring proceedings against" the offending party to ensure compliance with that order.
Id. at 216. The court explained that the trial court may award reasonable attorney
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fees to the moving party so that he or she is not forced "to fritter away in costs and
counsel fees" the amounts received under the order "by bringing repeated actions to
enforce payment. . . . " Id.
In this domestic case, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provided the authority for the
trial court to award Cassie the costs and attorney fees she incurred upon determining
that she substantially prevailed upon her multiple claims of Joshua refusing to obey
the orders of the Court.
Cassie's position is the award of fees was properly made by the trial court to
allow her, as the prevailing party to collect fees needlessly incurred due to Joshua's
recalcitrance and his dishonest and evasive conduct, giving rise to several
unnecessary hearings. Further, because Cassie's attorney billed at the $195 hourly
rate which was well below the usual and customary fee for services of this type in this
location, Joshua's claim on his page 37 that Cassie should only receive 2 hours worth
of reimbursement is ludicrous.
Joshua's challenge to the award of fees for the September 2010 contempt
finding completely failed to marshal any of the legions of evidence available to the trial
court concerning his conduct throughout the 18 months immediately preceding the
award, whereby he fully earned the right to pay his ex-wife's costs and attorney's fees
incurred in the several contempt hearings other than the divorce trial, for which she did
not receive any award of her fees.
This appeal was not well taken for good cause and has directly caused Cassie
to accumulate significant additional attorney's fees and costs that will equal or exceed
the fees she was forced to incur in the trial court.
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Unlike Joshua, Cassie does not have her father paying for the attorney fees
she has incurred in this action.(HT pg 291) Therefore, Cassie hereby explicitly and
respectfully requests that she be allowed to recover the attorney's fees incurred on
appeal in an amount to be determined by the court.
CONCLUSION
The appellant's dishonest and evasive actions in court during several court
hearings, his multiple incidents of contempt, his continuous stalling tactics and now his
decisively inadequate appellate brief have all combined to cause Cassie Clarke a
great injustice.
In responding to Joshua's appeal, Cassie was forced to incur substantial
additional attorney's fees in addition to those properly awarded to her by the trial court.
Cassie has prevailed on the issues presented to the trial court and assuming
with good cause that she will prevail on this appeal, Cassie Clarke asks this Court to
award her the fees she has incurred herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON THIS October \t , 2011.

Gary Buhler
Attorney for Cassie Clarke, Appellee
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